The best example of this is Mr Obama's rhetoric in 2007 and 2008 with his "hope and change" speeches and how his administration will be totally transparent. Once in office, of course it was all about politics and how he is able to 'change' the American dream into a nightmare.
He has succeeded in dividing the population into warring classes, those that believe they deserve more as against those that believe everyone should earn a living to the best of their abilities rather then wait for others to give them what they want.
Unfortunately many among us didn't understand the ideology of Mr Obama clearly enough to see his intentions and there by reelected him to continue his " fundamentally changing" America from a representative republic into a progressive socialist democracy.
Study: Political Competition Leads to Fiscal Irresponsibility decisions
Source: Steve Eide, "Does democracy cause pension mismanagement?" Public Sector Inc., August 21, 2014
August 26, 2014
Stephen Eide, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, reports on a new study from Sutirtha Bagchi at the University of Michigan. Bagchi sought to analyze the source of fiscal irresponsibility: is it more likely to arise in blue states or red states? In fact, Bagchi found that the places that were highly competitive at the ballot box were far more likely to have fiscally irresponsible pension plans.
According to Eide, Bagchi's report studied municipalities in Pennsylvania, taking 2,000 pension plans and comparing them with the votes that the political parties received in each locality in state and national races from 1980 to 2009.
What did he find? Communities that were more politically competitive had the least responsible pension plans; they offered high benefits with high discount rates (which clouds actual costs) and had much lower actuarial funding ratios (the ratio of assets compared to liabilities).
Bagchi concluded, "[P]olitical competition systematically alters the behavior of politicians when in office and induces them to make decisions that are sub-optimal for society in the long run." Politicians may offer extensive pension benefits while keeping taxes low in order to curry favor with voters and public employees, for example, but this only keeps pensions underfunded.
Eide notes that the study was only one of local Pennsylvania governments. However, according to Bagchi, the results in Pennsylvania municipalities are also applicable at the state-level. When he analyzed pension plans in Wisconsin over the two decades from 1989 to 2009, Bagchi reports finding that "as the level of political competition in a state goes up, the actuarial funded ratio of plans offered by that state declines."
According to Eide, Bagchi's report studied municipalities in Pennsylvania, taking 2,000 pension plans and comparing them with the votes that the political parties received in each locality in state and national races from 1980 to 2009.
What did he find? Communities that were more politically competitive had the least responsible pension plans; they offered high benefits with high discount rates (which clouds actual costs) and had much lower actuarial funding ratios (the ratio of assets compared to liabilities).
Bagchi concluded, "[P]olitical competition systematically alters the behavior of politicians when in office and induces them to make decisions that are sub-optimal for society in the long run." Politicians may offer extensive pension benefits while keeping taxes low in order to curry favor with voters and public employees, for example, but this only keeps pensions underfunded.
Eide notes that the study was only one of local Pennsylvania governments. However, according to Bagchi, the results in Pennsylvania municipalities are also applicable at the state-level. When he analyzed pension plans in Wisconsin over the two decades from 1989 to 2009, Bagchi reports finding that "as the level of political competition in a state goes up, the actuarial funded ratio of plans offered by that state declines."
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