I fear it's politics as usual and the American conscience that hampers success in this land of a thousand years of 'tribalism'. Best case is work under the Afghan rules and laws and kill the enemy at every opportunity.
Will we learn from history, even history of only a few years ago? Not likely.
Keep the faith
OUR AFGHAN ERROR
By RALPH PETERS
MISCALCULATING blindly, al Qaeda suffered a catastrophic defeat in Iraq.
Now our approach to Afghanistan bears an uncanny resemblance to the
terrorists' failed strategy.
Certainly, there's a vast difference between our humane agenda and al
Qaeda's monstrous appetite for blood. There's no moral equivalence.
Yet our ambition to convince local populations to change their culture
to suit us turns us into al Qaeda's kindly twin.
In Iraq, al Qaeda was an alien presence enforcing values at odds with
local traditions. And that, for all our protestations to the contrary,
is what we're up to in Afghanistan.
We claim we're "only" trying to change the Afghan political system and
economy, advancing the rule of law while introducing enlightened values.
What on earth is that about, if not deep cultural change?
In its brief Iraqi heyday, al Qaeda also sought to reorder politics,
commerce, law and human behavior. The terrorists /believed/ their
program was for the good of all. So do we.
But al Qaeda didn't bother to consult the Iraqis -- and, for all the
glasses of tea shared with tribal elders, we believe we know what's best
for Afghans.
In Iraq, al Qaeda's leaders were cocksure that the people would rally to
them. We, too, believe that the locals will eventually see our light.
(We can't bring ourselves to accept that al Qaeda's core members
/believe/ they're acting for humankind's good; imposing Sharia law isn't
just ward politics. We're more benign, but equally naive and headstrong.)
After a brief test drive, Iraqis rejected al Qaeda's product line. And
millions of Afghans don't want what we have to sell.
Al Qaeda arrived in Iraq burning with missionary zeal. We bring the
secular version. Al Qaeda butchered. We deluge the natives with
expensive beads and trinkets. But, like the terrorists, we refuse to see
the world through the eyes of those we're set on reforming.
We offer roads, clinics, schools, agricultural programs and no end of
strategic nannying (the failed Soviet development effort was even more
extensive, by the way). But we refuse to grasp the fundamental truth
that, like al Qaeda in Iraq, we're outsiders and always will be.
In Iraq, the home team rose against the foreign intruders from al Qaeda.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban are the homeboys.
Not all Afghans support the Talibs, of course. But brutal (to us)
religious strictures have deep appeal for millions of Afghan tribesmen.
/Our/ values speak to English-speaking urban intellectuals who lived
profitably in exile -- and even /they/ go native, when it's to their
advantage (prime example: President Hamid Karzai).
In Afghanistan, we're engaged in a /cultural/ struggle in which we can't
even count on the local allies we've enriched. The mission's a muddle.
Unlike al Qaeda in Iraq, we have no clear vision of the desired
end-state. We're just making it up as we go along.
"Classic" counterinsurgency strategy demands security for the
population. But who are we protecting Afghan villagers against?
Themselves. Does any US officer, apart from the greenest lieutenant,
believe that Afghan hillbillies truly desire our presence?
Our current nonstrategy is neither fish nor fowl. To secure the Afghan
population, we'd need at least as many troops as we had in Iraq at the
peak of the surge, more than 170,000. We'll soon have 70,000. That's
plenty to annoy the Afghans, but not to provide comprehensive security.
A more effective strategy would allow Afghans to be Afghans -- getting
us out of the aid-as-bribery business -- while /reducing/ troop numbers
and concentrating on killing /our/ enemies: al Qaeda terrorists and
their protectors.
Instead, we're putting our weapons on safe to focus on development in a
country that doesn't matter.
It's tough to do nation-building where there's no nation to build. Show
me one convincing sign of Afghan unity or true national consciousness
and I'll eat crow raw and unplucked.
/We're not thinking/. In Iraq, al Qaeda made the fatal mistake of trying
to hold ground. Now we're determined to "secure terrain" in Afghanistan.
But the focus in /every/ form of warfare, from counterinsurgency
operations to general war, must be on the enemy. Anything else is just
playing pretend -- while soldiers die.
In Afghanistan, we're asking people to change who they are. Al Qaeda
made the same mistake in Iraq. But at least the terrorists knew why.
/Ralph Peters' latest book is "Looking for Trouble."/
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